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PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING
The parties to this proceeding are:
Martin I. Broberg

-

Plaintiff, appellant

Tim Hess

-

Defendant, respondent

Karen Hess

-

Defendant, respondent

-iii-

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution and Utah
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(i) (1953) provide the Utah Supreme Court
jurisdiction over this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did plaintiff preserve any issue for appeal?

2.

Did the trial court's jury voir dire constitute a

clear abuse of discretion?
3.

If so, was plaintiff unduly prejudiced thereby?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1.

Defendants-respondents Hess ("defendants") object to

plaintiff-appellant Broberg's ("plaintiff") statement of the facts
in that although the trial below arose out of plaintiff's alleged
slip and fall at the basement apartment, rented by plaintiff from
defendants, the jury did not find as fact how plaintiff actually
injured himself and this matter was disputed at trial.
2.

The jury specifically found in the special verdict

that no act on the part of defendants caused plaintiff's alleged
injury.

(R. 226)
3.

Plaintiff's counsel never objected to the actual

jury voir dire conducted by the court.
4.

(Transcript, pp. 2-20)

Plaintiff's counsel was specifically given the

opportunity to submit further questions at the end of the trial
court's voir dire but failed to request any further questions once
he was made aware of the extent to which the trial court initially
intended to voir dire the jury.

(Transcript, p. 19)
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5.

Plaintiffs1 counsel passed the jury for cause with-

out any objection.
6.

(Transcript, pp. 19-20)

During voir dire, the court specifically asked

prospective jurors to state their own employment, their prior
employment if retired, their spouse's employment or their spouse's
prior employment if retired.
7.

(Transcript, p. 3)

The court asked prospective jurors if they were

acquainted with any of the parties.
8.

(Transcript, pp. 7-9)

The trial court asked prospective jurors if they

were acquainted with any counsel or their respective law firms.
(Transcript, pp. 10-11)
9.

The trial court asked prospective jurors whether or

not they were landlords (Transcript, p. 11); whether or not they
or their immediate families were tenants or involved in disputes
with landlords (Transcript, pp. 13-14); if any prospective juror
worked for an attorney (Transcript, p. 15); if any prospective
juror had a bias toward either party for having hired an attorney
(Transcript, p. 17); if any prospective juror had any problem with
applying the law as instructed by the judge (Transcript, p. 19);
or if there was any reason whatsoever that any prospective juror
could not try the case impartially (Transcript, pp. 14-15).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is undisputed that plaintiff did not timely object to
any questions given or omitted by the trial court during jury
voir dire.

He declined to ask the court for further questioning

at the close of the court's intended voir dire when the court
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asked him specifically for any additional questions.
the jury for cause without objection.

He passed

Having failed to raise such

objections at the appropriate time and having failed to put any
such objections in the record, such objections were waived and
cannot now be raised on appeal.

Plaintiff has not shown that the

trial court abused its discretion nor that any such alleged abuse
resulted in undue prejudice.

The Utah Supreme Court's holding in

Saltas v. Affleck, 105 P.2d 176 (Utah 1940), rendered subsequent
to Balle v. Smith, specifically held that it was reversible error
for prospective jurors to be interrogated as to their interest in
a spefically named insurance company or even generally so as to
indicate that an insurance company was the real party in interest.
Injection of insurance into this case would have been reversible
error.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF'S VOIR DIRE OBJECTION IS WAIVED
FOR FAILURE TO OBJECT AT TRIAL.
As noted on page 6 of Appellant's Brief, it was not until
after the jury returned a verdict against plaintiff and in favor
of defendant that plaintiff, in a motion for new trial, claimed
any error involving jury voir dire.
In King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987), an appeal
was taken alleging error on two grounds.

First, appellant therein

claimed that the trial court's failure to give particular jury
instructions warranted new trial.

Second, appellant therein

claimed that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to
-3-

ask jury voir dire to determine any juror's connection to
defendant's insurance company.

The court rejected appellant's

first argument on the basis that appellant had failed to object at
trial.

In this regard, the court stated:
The party claiming an error in the proceedings
also bears the responsibility of assuring that
"the record adequately preserves objection or
argument for review in the event of an appeal."
Barson, 682 P.2d at 837 (citation omitted).
Id. at p. 621.
As the Utah Supreme Court pointed out in Condas v. Condas,

618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980) :
Defects curable at trial cannot be relied upon
by a party if the trial court has had no
opportunity to rule thereon. See, Drugger v.
Cox, Utah, 564 P.2d 303 (1977). id. at p. 495.
In like manner, the Utah Supreme Court "will not review alleged
error when no objection at all is made at the trial level."

State

v. Leslie, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983); Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d
778 (Utah 1986) .
Plaintiff made no objection to the voir dire asked by the
trial court.

The trial court specifically asked counsel for

plaintiff if the jury was passed for cause and plaintiff's counsel
made no objection.
line 7)

(Transcript, p. 19, line 22 through p. 20,

Particularly instructive on this point is the case of

Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1984).

In that case,

appellants claimed error as to the manner of jury voir dire.
Supreme Court of Wyoming stated:
Furthermore, the appellant has not made any
showing by brief or argument with respect to
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The

prejudice arising out of any inhibition of
his exercise of preemptory challenges. The
record is silent as to whether or in what
manner the appellant exercised his preemptory
challenges. His argument is not that he was
denied his right with respect to the use of
preemptory challenges, but simply that he
could in some way have better utilized his
challenges if the trial court had not
exercised its discretion with respect to the
conduct of voir dire in the manner in which
it did. There is no error to be found in
this claim. The appellant was entitled to a
fair and impartial jury, not one which he
perceived to be sympathetic. In this regard
we note that the following matter does appear
in the record on appeal:
The Court: Are the parties satisfied
that a jury of 12, plus 2 alternates,
has been drawn and qualified in this
matter? Mr. Carroll?
Mr. Carroll: The state is satisfied,
Your Honor.
The Court:

And, Mr. Barnett?

Mr. Barnett: Defense is satisfied,
Your Honor.
Id. at pp. 1000, 1003.
Just as in Jahnke, plaintiff made no objections to the
questions actually asked by the court during voir dire, neither
did plaintiff object to the jury actually impaneled.
The requirement that appellants object on the record to
preserve an issue for appeal is well founded.

The establishment

of a record indicates both the objection and sets forth the
grounds thereof.

It alerts the trial court to the basis for the

objection, thus enabling the trial court to consider the merits of
the objection at the time it is raised in order to cure, if
necessary, any defect, thus allowing the case to proceed in a
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judicially efficient manner.
Plaintiff could have submitted to the court his proposed
jury voir dire prior to the morning of trial and had the court
rule prior to the day of trial.

Such procedure would have allowed

plaintiff to put any objections on the record at that time.
didnft.

Plaintiff had the opportunity to object at the time of

jury voir dire to the adequacy of questions actually asked.
didn't.

He

He

The trial court specifically solicited further questions

from plaintiff's counsel.

No further questions were requested by

plaintiff.

Plaintiff's counsel was asked if he passed the jury

for cause.

This he did.

Having failed to object at the time of

jury voir dire, plaintiff cannot now raise this point on appeal.
In Higgins v. Hermes, 89 N.M. 379, 552 P.2d 1227 (1976),
a defendant appealed a personal injury action claiming that
plaintiff's extensive jury voir dire was prejudicial.
The defendant contends that reversible error
was committed when the plaintiff's counsel
intensively questioned a potential juror on
voir dire about her employment with an insurance
company and about her investments in insurance
companies. The defendant argues that the
questioning was overly lengthy and thus
prejudicial to the defendant. No objection
was made during the course of this testimony
and therefore error was not preserved. State
v. James, 76 N.M. 376, 415 P.2d 350 (1966);
State v. Harris, 41 N.M. 426, 70 P.2d 757
(1937); Candelaria v. Gutierrez, 30 N.M. 195,
230 P. 436 (1924). [Emphasis added.]
Id. at p. 1228.
Cruz v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 707 P.2d 360 (Colo. App.
1985), is also helpful.

In Cruz, the court stated:

Plaintiff argues that, had the motion been
granted, certain allegedly improper questions
-6-

asked prospective jurors on voir dire or
directed to plaintiff on cross-examination
and some allegedly improper remarks in closing
argument would have been prohibited. However,
plaintiff's counsel did not object at the time
any of these questions were asked or remarks
were made. Therefore, errors, if any, were
waived. Christensen v. Hoover, 643 P.2d 525
(Colo. 1982); Spears Free Clinic and Hospital
for Poor Children v. Maier, 128 Colo. 263,
261 P.2d 489 (1953). [Emphasis added.]
Id. at 362.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION AS TO JURY VOIR DIRE.
As acknowledged by plaintiff on page 10 of his
Appellant's Brief, "matters of possible bias and prejudice on the
part of the jury are within the discretion of the trial court."
King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d at 622 (Utah 1987).
noted that

It has long been

the trial judge has considerable discretion as to the

manner and form in which he will conduct voir dire examination to
determine the qualifications of jurors.

Utah State Road Comm'n v.

Marriott, 21 Ut.2d 238, 444 P.2d 57 (1968).

In fact, matters of

possible bias on the part of the jury and the trial court's ruling
on whether to question prospective jurors with respect to such
possible bias "will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is
demonstrated that the court abused its discretion."
Constr. Co. Inc., 598 P.2d 336 (Utah 1979).

Maltby v. Cox

Thus, it is clear

plaintiff must first show that the trial court abused its
discretion.

He has not.

Plaintiff's reading of King v. Fereday, supra, on page 11
of his appellant's brief is inaccurate.
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Plaintiff asserts that:

The lower court's denial [in King v. Fereday]
of the requested questions was upheld by this
court only because the trial judge agreed to
ask if any juror had "stock ownership in a
business and, if so, the nature of the business."
Plaintiff neglects to note the questions actually asked in this
case by the trial court, including the questions inquiring into
the present or past employers of jurors and their spouses.
In King v. Fereday plaintiff therein asserted as error
the trial judge's refusal during jury voir dire to inquire about
the prospective jurors' connection to defendant's insurance
carrier.

After quoting Maltby v. Cox Constr. Co., supra, to the

effect that such matters were within the sound discretion of the
trial court and would not be disturbed on appeal unless
demonstrated to be an abuse of discretion, the Utah Supreme Court,
affirming, noted that plaintiff had failed to so demonstrate such
abuse.

The Supreme Court did not say it was upholding the trial

court's discretion "only because the trial judge agreed to ask if
any juror had stock ownership in a business . . .."In fact, the
Court stated:
We also note that trial judges typically ask
jurors about their occupations. These
questions were sufficient to bring to light
any connection a prospective juror might have
had with defendant's insurance carrier.
Second, plaintiff failed to include in the
record the questions actually asked during
the jury voir dire. As a result, a determination that the trial court abused its
discretion in its voir dire of the jury
would require speculation on our part.
Id. at 623.
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The trial court in this case asked each prospective
juror about their own employment, their past employment if they
were retired, their spouse's employment if they were married,
and their spouse's prior employment if the spouse was retired.
(Transcript at p. 3)

In addition, the court asked if any of

the jurors were acquainted with any of the parties (Transcript,
pp. 7-9); if any of the jurors were acquainted with counsel or
their respective law firms (Transcript, pp. 10-11); if any of
the prospective jurors were landlords (Transcript, p. 11); if
any of the jurors or their immediate families were tenants or
involved in disputes with landlords (Transcript, pp. 13-14); if
any prospective juror worked for an attorney (Transcript, p.
15); if any juror had a bias toward either party having hired
an attorney (Transcript, p. 17); if any prospective juror had
any problem with applying the law as instructed by the judge
(Transcript, p. 19); if there was any reason whatsoever the
prospective jurors could not try the case impartially
(Transcript, pp. 14-15); or if any juror had read or heard
articles calling for tort reform (Transcript, p. 17).
At the end of voir dire, the court specifically solicited
further questions from plaintiff's counsel but no further requests
were made.

(Transcript p. 19, lines 19-21) In fact, while at the

bench and while off the record, plaintiff's counsel fully
acquiesced to the trial court's decision regarding the very ques-
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tions at issue here.

This fact points out the necessity of put-

ting objections on the record.
From a review of the record, it is absolutely clear that
the trial court in no way abused its discretion in the course of
jury voir dire.
In addition to showing an abuse of disgression,
plaintiff, from the record, must also show prejudice arising from
the abuse.

In Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1984), the

court stated:
Furthermore, the party contesting the
rulings of the trial court with respect
to the scope and content of voir dire
examination of jurors is obligated to
establish not only an abuse of the trial
court's proper discretion, but he must
demonstrate the substantial prejudice to
his rights as a result of that abuse of
discretion. United States v. Robinson,
154 U.S. App. D.C. 265, 475 F.2d 376
(1973). See also, Hopkinson v. State,
[632 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1981) ];
* * *

Furthermore, the appellant has not made
any showing by brief or argument with
respect to prejudice arising out of any
inhibition of his exercise of preemptory
challenges. The record is silent as to
whether or in what manner the appellant
exercised his preemptory challenges. His
argument is not that he was denied his
right with respect to the use of preemptory challenges, but simply that he
could in some way have better utilized
his challenges if the trial court had not
exercised its discretion with respect to the
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conduct of voir dire in the manner in which
it did. There is no error to be found in
this claim. The appellant was entitled to a
fair and impartial jury, not one which he
perceived to be sympathetic. [Emphasis added.]
Id. at p. 1003.
When the record of the trial court's actual voir dire is
reviewed, there can be no question:

(1) That the court did not

abuse its discretion as to what questions it chose to ask; (2) that
absolutely no prejudice resulted to plaintiff as a result of the
questions actually asked; (3) that plaintiff completely acquiesced
in the questions actually asked by the court; and (4) that at the
end of jury voir dire, plaintiff declined to request any further
questioning of the jury.
Additionally, plaintiff's whole basis on appeal does not
stand scrutiny.

Plaintiff's position is that he has in some way

been prejudiced because he was unable to find out which jury
members had worked for an insurance company or owned an interest
in State Farm Insurance Company.

Neither of these possibilities

has been established by plaintiff in the record.

In fact, on the

record, no impaneled juror worked for an insurance company.
Prior to trial, the trial court granted Hess' Motion in
Limine that there would be no mention of insurance during the
trial.

Plaintiff agreed with this motion.

(R. 94)

At the outset then, no jury member was going to hear any
evidence or any mention of any insurance company whatsoever, much
less State Farm.

Therefore, it is absolutely clear that even if

one of the jury members had owned an interest in State Farm or had
worked for an insurance company some time in the past, such would
-11-

never be relevant to his consideration of the case since no jury
member would know (1) whether or not either plaintiff or
defendant was insured nor (2) that out of thousands of insurance
companies, defendant was insured by State Farm.

Plaintiff cannot

claim any prejudice under these circumstances.
When one considers plaintiff's position in light of the
simplest of analysis, it becomes clear that plaintiff!s only
interest in asking jury members whether or not they had worked for
an insurance company or whether or not they had a financial interest
in State Farm was to educate the jury that in fact Hess was
insured by State Farm.

This is clearly contrary to well settled

Utah law.
POINT III.
UTAH LAW FORBIDS THE INJECTION OF INSURANCE
INTO A NEGLIGENCE CASE SUCH AS THIS.
Plaintiff's brief relies almost entirely for Utah law on
Balle v. Smith, 17 P.2d 224 (Utah 1932).

That 1932 case was an

action for personal injuries arising out of an automobile
accident.

In that case the court did state that a plaintiff was

entitled to learn whether or not a juror was interested in or connected with an insurance company, but the court did not state
under what circumstances such disclosure was warranted.

The court

did state:
The universal rule is that it is irrelevant
to the issue of negligence whether the
defendant is carrying liability insurance or
not, and, subject to some qualifications which
need not be here mentioned, such testimony is
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wholly inadmissible- Courts have guarded
jealously against the introduction of such
evidence before the jury, not only because it
is irrelevant to the issues, but because jurors
are commonly thought to be prejudiced against
insurance companies, and, if the fact were
known that the defendant is insured, jurors
would be less inclined to consider the case
on the merits, and more inclined to render a
verdict for plaintiff and in a larger amount
than if the defendant, especially where the
defendant is an individual, had to bear the
loss alone- We do not say this suspicion is
well founded, but merely that such prejudice
is widely believed to exist. For the same
reasons arguments and statements of counsel
directly stating, or from which it may be
inferred, that the defendant is insured, are
forbidden. In many cases courts declare a
mistrial, or on appeal a reversal, where
counsel have abused their privilege by
improperly forcing the fact that defendant
is protected by indemnity insurance to the
attention of the jury. 1(3. at 229.
Not cited in Broberg's Appellant's Brief is the case of
Saltas v. Affleck, 105 P.2d 176 (Utah 1940), where, after
discussing at length the prior case of Balle v. Smith, supra, the
court held exactly contrary to Balle stating:
Within the rule of the cases it is prejudicial
error for counsel to ask each of the jurors
if he were an officer or stockholder of the
Northwest Casualty Company of Seattle, Washington
[the defendants1 insurer]. The same ethical
standards should be maintained in the questioning
of jurors as of witnesses.
The case of Alexiou v. Nockas, 171 Wash. 369,
17 P.2d 911, 914, is direct authority that the
examination of each juror, as was done in the
instant case as to his insurance connection
was prejudicial error. The court said: "The
examination of the jurors by respondent's
counsel constituted reversible error. We
cannot countenance such inappreciation of the
ethics as counsel manifested. The purpose of
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his questions was, patently, to inform the
jury that the loss would fall upon an insurance
company instead of the appellant."
We are of the opinion it was reversible error
for counsel to interrogate each juror as to
whether he were a stockholder in a specifically
named insurance company or generally so as to
indicate that an insurance company was the
probable real party in interest, a matter
foreign to the issues in the case, when no
preliminary questions had been asked.
Id. at p. 179. [Emphasis added.]
None of the prospective jurors in the instant case
indicated any affiliation whatsoever with an insurance company
during the jury voir dire.

The court asked each juror to identify

their own employer, their prior employer if they were retired,
their spouse's employer, and their spouse's former employer if
retired.

The record indicates that such questioning satisfied

plaintiff's interests in this regard.

If not, counsel should have

objected, giving the grounds for the objection.

He should have at

least requested further questioning such as ownership in a
business when asked by the court for any such further questions.
This he did not do.
In Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 U.2d 261, 409 P.2d 121 (Utah
1965), the court stated:
We do not depart from our former position:
that the question of insurance is immaterial
and should not be injected into the trial;
and that it is the duty of both counsel and
the court to guard against it. Id. at p. 123.
In Hill v. Cloward, 14 Ut.2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962), the
court, subsequent to Balle and Saltas, noted both the impropriety
of injecting insurance into the case and the requirement to object
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timely to preserve appeal:
It seems hardly necessary to state that the
matter of insurance is quite immaterial to
issues as to liability and damages, or the
amount thereof. It is also true that inasmuch
as the defendant is entitled to have this
extraneous matter excluded from the case,
the plaintiff is entitled to the same protection if he so desires. . . . In the instant
situation candor requires recognition that
it was improper for the defendant to inject
the matter of insurance into the case.
But there is an insuperable difficulty with
the plaintiff's position. His counsel let
the incident pass without objection and
without a request to rectify any harm he
thought had been done. Fair play and good
conscience require that he do so at the
earliest opportunity. It would be manifestly
unjust to permit a party to sit silently by,
believing that prejudicial error had been
committed, proceed with the trial to its
completion, and allow the jury to deliberate
and reach a verdict, to see if it wins, then
if he loses, come forward with a claim that
such an error rendered the verdict a nullity.
If this could be done, proceedings after such
an occurrence would be in vain and thus an
imposition upon the court, the jury and all
concerned. The court will not countenance
any such mockery of its proceedings. If
something occurs which the party thinks is
wrong and so prejudicial to him that he
thereafter cannot have a fair trial, he
must make his objection promptly and seek
redress by moving for a mistrial, or by
having cautionary instructions given, if that
is deemed adequate, or be held to waive whatever right may have existed to do so.
Id. at pp. 187-188. [Emphasis added.]
In Ivie v. Richardson, 9 U.2d 5, 336 P.2d 781 (1959), the
court stated:
There are additional circumstances in the
instant case that are indicative of the fact
that a fair trial was not had by the defendant.
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Counsel for the plaintiff appears to have tried
quite overtly to get before the jury the idea
that the defendant was covered by insurance.
Defendant's attorney found it necessary in
cross-examining plaintiff to use a statement
taken from her some time after the accident.
Although counsel were well aware that this man
was an insurance company investigator, plaintiff's
counsel persisted in inquiring about identification
of this man in the presence of the jury. Inquiry
as to who the man was was quite proper, but
inquiry as to his connections and purpose
obviously lent itself to the thinly veiled
ulterior design of getting the fact of insurance
before the jury. There seems to be no question
about the impression it made. Id. at pp. 786-787.
As explained at the end of Point II of this brief,
plaintiff's only possible purpose in requesting questions
regarding insurance was to get the inference of insurance before
the jury.

There was no possibility of bias resulting from an

undisclosed presence of insurance.

No juror worked for an

insurance company and no impaneled juror knew the parties.
evidence was anticipated regarding insurance.

No

Only if the jury

was to be made aware that the defendants were insured, and insured
by State Farm, could there be any possibility of bias.

This did

not occur.
Finally, it has long been Utah law that:
The safeguarding against disclosure to a jury
of insurance coverage in personal injury trials
is a very touchy subject which lawyers and
judges have always been obliged to handle with
such caution as to justify use of the metaphore
"walking on eggs." The understanding has always
been that it was prejudicial error to deliberately
inject insurance into such a trial.
* * *
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We do not depart from our former position: that
the question of insurance is immaterial and
should not be injected into the trial; and that
is the duty of both counsel and the court to
guard against it* Young v. Barney, 20 Ut.2d 108,
433 P.2d at 848-849 (1967). [Emphasis added.]
It should be noted that the Utah Supreme Court in Young
emphasized this point in footnote, stating:
The writer recalls as pertinent here the wry
comment of a much respected former member of
this court in a comparable situation: "We
could not make it any more definite unless we
said damn it". [Emphasis added.] ^d. at p. 849.
That such injection of insurance would be reversible error, see
also, Gittens v. Lundberg, 3 Ut.2d 392, 284 P.2d 1115, 1118 (1955).
Clearly, it was well within the discretion of the trial
court not to ask members of the jury about their connection with
an insurance company in light of the fact that no issue in the
case was to turn on insurance.

Furthermore, the court's actual

questioning about the juror's employment as well as their spouse's
employment was sufficient to meet plaintiff's needs and within the
discretion of the trial court.

Finally, as the court noted in

King v. Fereday, supra, plaintiff's counsel having failed to
object at the time of trial waived any objection here.
CONCLUSION
It is undisputed, long standing Utah law that plaintiff
cannot raise as a point on appeal an objection not raised at
trial.

Plaintiff's counsel had every opportunity to object and to

put such objections on the record.

This he did not do. He

further failed to request any further questions which did not
reach issues not covered in the jury voir dire when such further
-17-

questions were solicited by the trial court.

He further passed

the jury for cause without any objection and in fact made no
protest whatsoever until after the jury returned a verdict against
him.
The conduct of jury voir dire has long been within the
discretion of the trial court.

Without clearly showing that the

trial court abused its discretion and that such abuse was
prejudicial to plaintiff, no appeal is well taken even if it had
been properly preserved.
Notwithstanding the absence of plaintiff's objection at
trial, the opportunity plaintiff had to have further questions
submitted to the jury, and plaintiff's passing the jury for cause,
the trial court's ruling, was not only within the court's
discretion, but was required under Utah law.

The court's holding

in Saltas v. Affleck, subsequent to Balle v. Smith, as well as
long standing Utah law state unequivocably that it is reversible
error to inject insurance coverage into a negligent action such as
this.

The sole motivation for plaintiff's requested voir dire

questions at issue in this case was to inform the jury of the
presence of insurance.

This was clearly inappropriate.

For the above-stated reasons, it is clear that the trial
court's actions should be affirmed in every respect.
DATED this

Y

day of December, 1987.
STRONG & HANNI
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